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On June 13, 2011, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court swiftly con-
stricted the already narrow right for private individuals to bring claims
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Exchange
Act).' Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, a third
decision establishing the boundaries of the § 10(b) implied private
right of action,2 further clarified the role that ancillary individuals or
entities would play in securities litigation.3
Pursuant to the Exchange Act, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) promulgated Rule 10b-5, 4 which delineates the forbid-
den conduct contained within § 10(b). 5 In relevant portion, and to be
addressed in further detail below, Rule 10b-5 forbids anyone "[t]o
make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made . . . not
misleading." 6 In Janus, the Court addressed in what circumstances
auxiliary corporate actors may be liable under § 10(b) for making al-
legedly untrue or misleading statements.7 The Court drew a bright
line between "secondary actors"-those who assisted in making the
statement-and "primary actors"-those who can be easily character-
ized as having made the statement.8 The Court held that an actor is
liable only if the actor actually made the statement at issue and articu-
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Ariane D. Vuono, Massachusetts Appeals Court. J.D., Ford-
ham University School of Law, 2012; B.A., Clark University, 2008. A special thank you to Brian
Farber and Tom Holber, whose comments and insight were instrumental in producing this
Article.
1. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011).
2. See generally Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148 (2008)
(evaluating the liability of vendors and customers under § 10(b)); Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164 (1994) (holding that private plaintiffs may
not maintain an aiding and abetting suit under § 10(b)).
3. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303.
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added).
7. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
8. Id. at 2302-03.
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lated that a statement's maker "is the person or entity with ultimate
authority over the statement, including its content and whether and
how to communicate it."9
In light of Janus, this Article will examine various subsequent cases
that have grappled with establishing exactly who has ultimate author-
ity over the statement. Part II will briefly articulate the relevant statu-
tory law on which the decision was based, as well as the relevant
preceding case law. Notably, the section will examine "attribution,"
which is both the key inquiry in discerning between primary and sec-
ondary liability under the Exchange Act and the legal principle be-
hind holding secondary actors liable for misstatements and omissions
under Rule 10b-5. Part II will first introduce the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion, as well as the specific actors, issues, and circumstances of its
opinion. It will then go into detail as to why the Supreme Court over-
turned the Fourth Circuit, paying particular attention to Justice
Thomas's deference to prior case law, semantic reasoning, and general
failure to be persuaded by a vocal dissent. Part III examines Janus's
impact by scanning subsequent case law. Notably, other cases have
usually yielded consistent results in assessing the circumstances in
which corporate officers and related corporate entities may be liable
for statements made on behalf of a corporation. The part will also
address and distinguish the decision's impact on SEC enforcement ac-
tions. This Article concludes with select critiques of the Janus deci-
sion and argues deference to corporate fraud in general.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF STATUTORY LIABILITY UNDER
§ 10(b) AND JANUS
A. Statutory Liability
Janus involved alleged misstatements in a prospectus disseminated
on behalf of a group of mutual funds (the Funds) pertaining to market
timing practices.10 First Derivative Traders (First Derivative), share-
holders of Janus Capital Group (JCG) stock, filed a class action
against both JCG and Janus Capital Management (JCM), alleging that
JCG and JCM manipulated the Funds through the use of said market
timing transactions, in which a fund broker manipulates variances in
fund pricing due to gaps in time-zone differences between foreign and
domestic markets." The issue was whether JCM, the Funds' mutual
9. Id. at 2302 (emphasis added).
10. See id. at 2300.
11. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 116-17 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom.
Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296; In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 529 F.3d 207, 210-11 (4th Cir. 2008).
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fund adviser, could be liable for its parent's-JCG's-dissemination
of the prospectuses, which articulated a priority to forbid market
timing. 12
JCG and JCM issued prospectuses on behalf of the Funds, making
them available to the investing public through a website.13 First De-
rivative alleged that through this procedure, the entities communi-
cated the misleading impression that JCG and JCM would implement
measures to curb market timing. 14 However, no such measures were
taken.15 Accordingly, had the truth been known, the Funds would
have been less attractive to investors, and consequently, JCG would
have realized lower revenues, depreciating JCG's share value.16
First Derivative contended that JCG and JCM "materially misled
the investing public" and brought an action under § 10(b).17 The Ex-
change Act provides, in relevant part, that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange [t]o use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
... any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contra-
vention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.18
The SEC, pursuant to § 10(b), promulgated Rule lOb-5, which makes
it unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement ... in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."19 Although the text of the Ex-
change Act does not provide the right to bring a private cause of ac-
tion-such that First Derivative could bring its class action-"the
Court has found a right of action implied in the words of the statute
and its implementing regulation." 20
Unfortunately, First Derivative might have been doomed from the
start. Permeating the Janus decision was the Supreme Court's hesi-
tance to expand the implied private right of action in limiting the ac-
tors against whom plaintiffs may bring claims.21 In Stoneridge
12. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 121.
13. Id. at 116.
14. Id. at 121.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
18. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
19. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2012) (emphasis added).
20. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008).
21. See id. (noting that the Court did not extend the implied right in Central Bank). Further,
"[t]he history of the § 10(b) private right and the careful approach the Court has taken before
2012] 117
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Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., the Court ob-
served that the "§ 10(b) private cause of action is a judicial construct
that Congress did not enact in the text of the relevant statutes," and
"it is settled that there is an implied cause of action only if the under-
lying statute can be interpreted to disclose the intent to create one." 22
The Court held that "[t]he decision to extend the cause of action is for
Congress," and "[t]hough it remains the law, the § 10(b) private right
should not be extended beyond its present boundaries." 23 Indeed, as
evidence of its deference, the Court has noted that "Congress, in en-
acting the securities laws, did not intend to provide a broad federal
remedy for all fraud" 24 and that Congress and the SEC did not enact
"§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 to cover the corporate universe." 25
In Stoneridge, the Court articulated the six elements of a private
cause of action under § 10(b): "(1) a material misrepresentation or
omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security;
(4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss;
and (6) loss causation." 26 Earlier, in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v.
First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., the Court held that a defendant
cannot be liable absent a "showing that the plaintiff relied upon the
[defendant's] statements or actions." 27 It found that reliance is essen-
tial to ensuring that the "requisite causal connection between a defen-
dant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's injury" exists. 28 In
Stoneridge, the Court found a "rebuttable presumption of reliance" in
two different circumstances. 29 First, reliance exists if there is an omis-
sion of a material fact by one with a duty to disclose, whereby no
specific proof of reliance is necessary, and second, relevant to this dis-
cussion, under the fraud-on-the-market doctrine,30 reliance is pre-
proceeding without congressional direction provide further reasons to find no liability here." Id.
at 164; see also Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1085 (1991) ("[T~he breadth of
the [private] right once recognized should not, as a general matter, grow beyond the scope con-
gressionally intended.").
22. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 164.
23. Id. at 165.
24. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982).
25. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1977) (quoting William L. Cary,
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 700 (1974)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).
26. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157 (emphasis added).
27. Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 180
(1994) (emphasis added).
28. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988).
29. Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
30. The fraud-on-the-market doctrine allows a claimant to bring a claim for fraud if it proves
the alleged fraudulent statement affected the market as a whole. See, e.g., id. at 171.
MAKER'S MARK
sumed when alleged statements at issue become known to the
public.3'
Plaintiffs may struggle to establish reliance when ancillary actors
operating behind the scenes are ultimately responsible for the miscon-
duct.32 One scholar noted that "[a]s we move down the corporate hi-
erarchy, attribution typically disappears, and so the case for declaring
the deceptive actions of, say, a [secondary actor] to be a violation of
Rule 10b-5 gets harder."33 For the first time in 1994, the Court ad-
dressed the scope of Rule 10b-5 and whether it reached such secon-
dary actors. 34 Foreshadowing its judicial deference, the Court in
Central Bank heeded that delineating the appropriate bounds of a
§ 10(b) claim "has posed difficulty because Congress did not create a
private § 10(b) cause of action and had no occasion to provide gui-
dance about the elements of a private liability scheme."35
In Central Bank, the Court examined whether a bank may be "sec-
ondarily liable under § 10(b) for its conduct in aiding and abetting the
fraud" when it assisted a bond issuer in making false statements.36 In
examining the bank's § 10(b) liability, the Court first determined that
the bank's conduct3 7 did not amount to actually making the false
statements, but rather was no more than merely aiding and abetting
the fraud.38 The Court ruled that establishing public reliance on mere
aiding and abetting would be extremely difficult. 39 The Court
surmised that "[w]ere we to allow the aiding and abetting action pro-
posed in this case, the defendant could be liable without any showing
that the plaintiff relied upon the aider and abettor's statements or ac-
tions." 40 Emphatically, the Court held that "Congress knew how to
impose aiding and abetting liability when it chose to do so," and if
31. Id. at 159.
32. See, e.g., Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011); Stoner-
idge, 552 U.S. 148; Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. 164.
33. Donald C. Langevoort, Lies Without Liars? Janus Capital and Conservative Securities Ju-
risprudence 17 (Georgetown Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 12-019, 2012), avail-
able at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/fwps-papers/162.
34. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 169-70.
35. Id. at 173.
36. Id. at 166-67, 191 (internal quotation marks omitted).
37. The bank acted as an indenture trustee to a bond issuer, and through its position, the bank
assisted a securities issuer in making false statements. Id. at 167.
38. Id. at 180.
39. This follows logically: a secondary actor's mere assistance in conducting fraud could be
well-shielded or discreetly performed, leaving the investor none the wiser as to the behind-the-
scenes conduct.
40. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 180.
2012] 119
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"Congress intended to impose aiding and abetting liability, we pre-
sume it would have used the words aid and abet."4 1
Despite holding that § 10(b) liability does not extend to aiders and
abettors, the Court acknowledged that secondary actors, provided the
right type of conduct, can still be held primarily liable for their ac-
tions.42 Assuming all of the other requirements are met, a secondary
actor such as "a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipu-
lative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which
a purchaser or seller of securities relies" may be liable under § 10(b). 4 3
The Court reasoned as such by observing the likelihood that multiple
violators would participate in schemes to defraud in collusion with an-
other, as opposed to acting alone.44
The Court revisited the issue of secondary actor liability in Stoner-
idge, where respondents Scientific-Atlanta and Motorola were alleged
to have participated in misconduct arising from, inter alia, Charter
Communications's fraudulent revenue reporting practices. 45 In find-
ing that the respondents were not liable under § 10(b), the Court em-
phasized that "[r]espondents had no role in preparing or disseminating
Charter's financial statements," but rather alleged only that they
"knew or were in reckless disregard of Charter's intention to use the
transactions to inflate its revenues." 46 Where respondents were only
"acting in concert with Charter," the Court, impliedly harkening back
to Central Bank, found that "investors cannot be said to have relied
upon any of respondents' deceptive acts." 47
B. Attribution
In light of Central Bank, courts increasingly required concrete evi-
dence that secondary actors were directly responsible for the state-
ments at issue.48 Indeed, "[i]f Central Bank is to have any real
meaning, a defendant must actually make a false or misleading state-
41. Id. at 176-77 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. See id. at 191.
43. Id. (assuming that the secondary actors met all other requirements for liability).
44. See id. (noting that respondent named four violators in its complaint).
45. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 155 (2008).
46. Id. at 155, 166-67 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added).
48. See, e.g., Affco Invs. 2001, LLC v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 625 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2010)
(requiring explicit attribution to show reliance under § 10(b)); Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256
F.3d 1194, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 2001) (outlining factors that require an actor to disclose informa-
tion or otherwise become liable). See generally Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 1998). But see U.S. SEC v. Carter, No. 10 C 6145, 2011 WL 5980966, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 28,
2011) (using the Janus theory of ultimate authority to deny defendant's motion to dismiss a
§ 10(b) claim).
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ment in order to be held liable under Section 10(b)." 4 9 Harkening
back to Central Bank, regardless of the level of assistance, anything
short of actually making the statement was held to be aiding and abet-
ting, and is insufficient for § 10(b) liability.50
One way courts have found that ancillary actors make fraudulent
statements in fraud-on-the-market cases is by finding that investors
would have relied on the statements through what is known as attribu-
tion.51 In such a case, the plaintiff must prove that interested public
investors would attribute the allegedly misleading statement to the
secondary actor.52 Inversely, "a secondary actor cannot incur primary
liability under [Rule 10b-5] for a statement not attributed to that actor
at the time of its dissemination." 53
Preceding the Janus decision, a circuit split existed over the degree
of attribution necessary to satisfy the reliance requirement.54 The
Second, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits adopted a bright-line attribution
rule, finding that § 10(b) applies only to statements that were publicly
attributable to the secondary actor that made the statement.55 The
Ninth Circuit, however, circumscribed that substantial participation or
significant involvement in preparing the statement would be sufficient
to give rise to § 10(b) liability. 56 The key inquiry-relevant to the Su-
preme Court's analysis-was whether the secondary actor's conduct,
participation, or involvement in the fraud would signal to "interested
investors . . . that the defendant was responsible for the statement at
49. Shapiro v. Cantor, 123 F.3d 717, 720 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added) (quoting In re MTC
Elec. Techs. S'holders Litig., 898 F. Supp. 974, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)).
50. Shapiro, 123 F.3d at 720.
51. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2302 (2011); Sha-
piro, 123 F.3d at 720.
52. See, e.g., In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111, 122 (4th Cir. 2009).
53. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added) (quoting Wright, 152 F.3d at 175) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., Affco Invs. 2001, LLC v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 625 F.3d 185, 195 (5th Cir. 2010);
Ziemba v. Cascade Int'l, Inc., 256 F.3d 1194, 1206-07, 1211-12 (11th Cir. 2001); Wright, 152 F.3d
at 178.
56. See, e.g., Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2000); Dannen-
berg v. Painewebber, Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628-29 (9th
Cir. 1994).
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the time it was made."57 "Thus, a defendant must know or should
know that his representation would be communicated to investors."58
1. Bright-Line Attribution
In In re Global Crossing, the class alleged that Arthur Andersen
(Andersen) had prepared, directed, controlled, and helped create or
materially assisted in preparing false statements.59 In examining
whether the public would attribute the statement to Andersen, the
Southern District of New York observed that "in order for liability to
attach to a defendant, the misrepresentation had to be attributed to
that specific actor at the time of public dissemination, that is, in ad-
vance of the investment decision." 60 Thus, the Court refocused its in-
quiry by citing to In re Lernout & Hauspie-a Massachusetts decision
that allowed certain claims to survive a motion to dismiss on grounds
that the plaintiffs had alleged that the KPMG affiliate had actually
made the false statements through its active role in preparing them. 61
The court in In re Global Crossing found that the plaintiffs had pled
sufficient reliance to a significant portion of Andersen's conduct be-
cause "Andersen can be held liable only for the statements it is al-
leged to have made" and not those in which it merely assisted or
participated. 62
This decision contravened a recent Second Circuit decision, In re
Scholastic Corp., which held that "[a] defendant may be held liable for
fraudulent statements under Section 10(b) where a plaintiff alleges
sufficient facts that demonstrate that a defendant was personally re-
sponsible for making those statements, even if he or she is not identi-
57. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 124; accord In re Global Crossing, Ltd. Sec.
Litig., 322 F. Supp. 2d 319, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Thus, in order for a defendant to be held liable
for a claim brought under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must allege that that defendant made a false or
misleading statement or omission that was attributed to him or her, or that s/he participated in
[a] fraudulent scheme or other activity proscribed by the securities laws." (quoting SEC v. U.S.
Envtl., Inc., 155 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1998)) (internal quotations omitted)).
58. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 122 (quoting Wright, 152 F.3d at 175) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
59. See In re Global Crossing, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 331.
60. Id. (quoting Wright, 152 F.3d at 175) (internal quotation marks omitted).
61. Id. (citing Filler v. Lernout (In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig.), 230 F. Supp. 2d 152,
166-68 (D. Mass. 2002)).
62. Id. at 335. The Second Circuit has additionally held that plaintiffs may adequately plead
reliance against corporate officers for statements appearing in analyst reports not directly attrib-
uted to the officers. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that in § 10(b)
litigation a corporation and its officers could be liable for misleading information appearing in
analyst reports when the corporation and its officers either intentionally fostered a mistaken
belief concerning a material fact, or adopted or placed their imprimatur on the reports).
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fled as the speaker."63 Arguably, this decision was further from both
Janus and the bright-line attribution test.64 However, deferring to the
Supreme Court's rationale in Central Bank, the court in In re Global
Crossing found that Andersen would be liable only for the statements
it directly made.65
Likewise, in Affco Investments, 2001 LLC v. Proskauer Rose, LLP,
the Fifth Circuit affirmed the need to establish a bright-line direct at-
tribution test.66 In that case, the plaintiffs had invested in a KPMG-
architected tax avoidance structure. 67 The defendant, Proskauer,
worked privately with KPMG and other defendants behind the scenes
to prepare opinions and analyses reaffirming the legality and validity
of the structure.68 Affco invested in the tax structure, despite never
having neither seen or heard of any Proskaeur work on the deal nor
been aware that Proskauer was directly responsible for the scheme. 69
As such, the court found that, "[w]ithout direct attribution to Pros-
kauer of its role in the tax scheme, reliance on Proskauer's participa-
tion in the scheme [was] too indirect for liability."70
2. Substantial Participation Test
The Ninth Circuit, however, took a less direct approach to secon-
dary actor liability under § 10(b). 71 In In re Software Toolworks Inc.,
the court weighed § 10(b) claims against Deloitte, acting as auditor for
Toolworks. 72 Deloitte participated in drafting two letters that Tool-
works sent to the SEC, which investors alleged to have falsely stated
Toolkworks's financial data and misled the SEC as to the existence of
certain contracts.7 3 The court held that Deloitte's substantial partici-
63. In re Global Crossing, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 331 (emphasis added) (discussing the In re Scho-
lastic Corp. Securities Litigation decision, in which the court found the vice president of a corpo-
ration "primarily responsible for communications . . . [in which he was] involved in the drafting,
producing, reviewing and/or disseminating of the false and misleading statements" (quoting In re
Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 76 (2d Cit. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
64. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2303 (2011); see
also supra note 55 and accompanying text.
65. In re Global Crossing, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 335.
66. See Affco Invs. 2001, LLC v. Proskauer Rose, LLP, 625 F.3d 185, 195-96 (5th Cit. 2010).
67. Id. at 187-88.
68. Id. at 188.
69. Id. at 188, 195.
70. Id. at 192; accord Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 156 (2d Cir.
2010).
71. See, e.g., Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 & n.5 (9th Cir. 2000); Dannen-
berg v. Painewebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628-29 (9th
Cir. 1994).
72. In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig., 50 F.3d at 628-29.
73. Id. at 628.
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pation and intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent
statements were grounds for primary liability, even though that partic-
ipation might not necessarily mean that Deloitte made the
statements. 74
III. ANALYSIS OF JANUS CAPITAL GROUP, INC. v. FIRST
DERIVATIVE TRADERS
A. The Fourth Circuit Decision
In light of Central Bank, Stoneridge, and significant other case law
on the subject, the Fourth Circuit addressed where and how to draw
the line between a primary actor-one who clearly makes the false
statement-and a secondary actor-one who did not technically make
the statement but whose participation might have been so vital as to
satisfy the attribution standard.75 The key inquiry was whether the
secondary actors may be held primarily liable. 76 The court observed
that even the courts that adopted the direct attribution test "con-
cluded that in certain circumstances auditors and corporate officers
may be responsible for statements issued by the corporation or ana-
lysts that were not directly attributed to the auditors or officers."77
By weighing JCM's duties as investment adviser to the Funds, the
Fourth Circuit had to determine whether "interested investors would
have inferred that either or both defendants played a substantial role
in drafting or approving the allegedly misleading prospectuses" based
on JCG's role as an asset management firm and parent of JCM.7 8
While the prospectuses did not explicitly name JCG and JCM as the
drafters, First Derivative nevertheless alleged that JCG and JCM may
be held responsible for the statements in the prospectuses because "as
a practical matter the management company [that is, JCM]" ran the
Funds, and as a result, the public would attribute the misstatements in
the prospectuses to JCM.79
Although the Fourth Circuit did not adopt the substantial participa-
tion standard, it noted its significance given the uniquely pivotal and
involved role investment advisers play in managing a fund's opera-
74. See id. at 628 & n.3, 629.
75. See generally In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009).
76. Id. at 121.
77. Id. at 124.
78. Id. (emphasis added). JCM and JCG were also responsible for the dissemination of the
Janus fund prospectuses. Id. This point alludes to the Ninth Circuit's approach addressed in
Part II(B)(2).
79. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 125 (emphasis added).
tions and providing necessary decision-making.80 "Unlike most busi-
ness organizations . . . mutual funds are typically organized and
operated by an investment adviser that is responsible for the day-to-
day operations of the fund."81 Despite that the investment adviser is
separate and distinct from the fund it advises, its primary responsibil-
ity and loyalty nevertheless are to its shareholders-First Derivative
here.82
Likewise, it entails that differences exist between a direct investor
and a mutual fund investor. Whereas an ordinary investor is solely
responsible for researching and staying up to date with a company in
which it directly invests, "a mutual fund investor stands in a disadvan-
taged position in terms of identifying information probative of
problems affecting his or her investments." 8 3 This is so for two rea-
sons: (1) a fund passes the research element of staying abreast of the
varying underlying companies to the fund adviser; and (2) the investor
may not know exactly where his or her money is invested.
Specifically, as an investment adviser to the Funds, JCM was "re-
sponsible for the day-to-day management of [the] investment portfo-
lio and other business affairs of the funds and furnishe[d] advice and
recommendations concerning the funds' investments, as well as ad-
ministrative, compliance and accounting services for the funds. "84
The complaint alleged that the defendant wrote and represented its
policy against market timing and publicly issued false and misleading
statements.85 In addition to practically running the Funds, the portfo-
lio managers and the executives to whom they reported were all em-
ployees of the same company.86 For instance, "under the heading
80. Id. at 125-26. The court went on to note that "[t]o the interested investor familiar with
the organizational structure of mutual funds, plaintiffs' allegations here would have been readily
known or ascertainable. Such an investor would understand that [a] mutual fund does not oper-
ate on its own or employ a full time staff." Id. at 126 (quoting Clifford E. Kirsch, Sutherland
Asbill & Brennan LLP, Mutual Fund Organizational Structure Powerpoint Presentation, in NuTrs
& BOLTS OF FIN. PRODS. 359 (Practising Law Institute 2005)) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). Consequently, "[m]ost of the operations of a mutual fund are carried out by service prov-
iders." Id. at 126 (quoting Bibb L. Strench & Kathryn L. Quirk, The Advisory Relationship/
Portfolio Management, in THE ABCs OF MUTUAL FUNDS 207 (Practising Law Institute 2006))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
81. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 126.
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423
(D.N.J. 2007), rev'd, 543 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2008), aff'd sub nom. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 130 S.
Ct. 1784 (2010).
84. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 125 (internal quotation marks omitted).
85. See id. at 121.
86. See id. at 125-26.
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'Management of the Fund,' the February 25, 2002, prospectus for the
Janus Mercury Fund lists only .. . JCM."87
This, along with JCM's listed involvement in the prospectus at issue,
led the Fourth Circuit to believe that interested investors would easily
recognize JCM's role with regard to both the fund and the prospectus
dissemination.88 Grappling with the nettlesome attribution test, the
court reasoned that "although the individual fund prospectuses are
unattributed on their face, the clear essence of plaintiffs' complaint is
that JCG and JCM helped draft the misleading prospectuses."89 Thus,
despite Stoneridge's factual concern that investors could not attribute
the actions of secondary actors and policy concern that such a legal
principle is "consistent with the narrow dimensions we must give to a
right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the
statute and did not expand when it revisited the law,"90 the Fourth
Circuit found that the plaintiff had sufficiently plead reliance.91
The court subsequently found that the defendants made their repre-
sentations public by issuing the prospectuses for Janus, thereby mak-
ing them available to the investing public via SEC filings, and by
disseminating the information over the JCG website.92 The court held
that when misleading statements are indisputably public, the inquiry
then turns on whether the investing public would have attributed the
statement to the secondary actor-JCM.93 Thus, given JCM's unique
investment adviser role, the control that it exerted over the Funds,
and the public nature of the representations, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded that First Derivative had sufficiently pled reliance to support a
claim under § 10(b), in spite of the fact that JCM technically did not
make the statement.94
87. Id. at 126.
88. Id. at 127.
89. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 121.
90. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 155, 166-67 (2008).
91. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 128.
92. Id. at 121. The court found that reliance was sufficiently pled with respect to only JCM.
Id. at 128. "Although JCG, like JCM, played a role in the dissemination of the fund prospec-
tuses on the Janus website, this fact, taken by itself, is insufficient in this case for [the court] to
infer that interested investors would believe JCG had prepared or approved the Janus fund
prospectuses." Id.
93. Id. at 127.
94. Id. at 128.
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B. The Supreme Court Decision
1. The Majority's Decision: Making the Statement
In contrast to the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court focused its
inquiry on whether JCM simply made the alleged misstatements
under the plain language of Rule 10b-5. 9 5 First Derivative urged that
JCM's role as an investment adviser should guide the Court's decision,
given JCM's "well-recognized and uniquely close relationship" be-
tween itself and the mutual fund. 96 Specifically, First Derivative sug-
gested "that an investment adviser should generally be understood to
be the 'maker' of the statements by its client mutual fund, like a play-
wright whose lines are delivered by an actor." 97 First Derivative con-
tended that JCM, as adviser, commissioned the actions of their
affiliated brokers and maintained practical control over the market
timing practices and thus was responsible for the Funds' actions.98
Similarly, the SEC, in averring that the Court should hold Janus Capi-
tal liable, urged the Court to adopt a definition of "make" that closely
aligned with the verb "create," as in "to cause to exist, appear, or
occur." 99
Justice Thomas, writing for the Court, declined to adopt either in-
terpretation.'oo Thomas held that "[f]or purposes of Rule lOb-5, the
maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority
over the statement, including its content and whether and how to com-
municate it."1O1 Further, the Court held that "[o]ne who prepares or
publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker."102 Re-
garding attribution, the Court stated that attribution within a state-
ment "is strong evidence that a statement was made by-and only
by-the party to whom it is attributed." 0 3 The Court analogized First
95. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 131 S. Ct. 2296, 2301 (2011).
96. Id. at 2304.
97. Id.
98. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 126-27 ("According to the complaint, JCM in its
role as investment advisor to the Janus funds is responsible for the day-to-day management of
[the] investment portfolio and other business affairs of the funds and furnishes advice and rec-
ommendations concerning the funds' investments, as well as administrative, compliance and ac-
counting services for the funds." (internal quotations omitted)).
99. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303. Thus, the argument follows that a statement's maker could be a
corporate officer whose participation in the statement's publication is so vital that "interested
investors would have inferred that either or both defendants played a substantial role in drafting
or approving the allegedly misleading prospectuses." In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at
124 (emphasis added); see id. at 127-29; see also supra note 71 and accompanying text.
100. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303-04.
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Derivative's argument that their intricate role in managing the Fund
should generate liability, as speechwriter and a speaker, 104 concluding
that "[e]ven when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is en-
tirely within the control of the person who delivers it."105
Thus, despite finding that "all of the officers of Janus Investment
Fund were also officers of JCM," the Court focused on the Funds'
status as a "separate legal entity" in finding that JCM did not possess
ultimate authority over the statement.106 The Court recognized that
"[o]nly Janus Investment Fund-not JCM-bears the statutory obli-
gation to file the prospectuses with the SEC."107 Regarding the infor-
mation itself, the Court held that nothing "on the face of the
prospectuses indicate[d] that any statements therein came from JCM
rather than Janus Investment Fund-a legally independent entity with
its own board of trustees."s08 Despite the fact that the "Janus Man-
agement employees drafted and reviewed the Fund prospectuses, in-
cluding language about 'market timing,"1 09 the Court apportioned
the liability to the Fund itself, whose SEC reporting requirements ex-
hibited their ultimate authority over the statement.110
The Court abrogated any case law suggesting that a party, solely by
virtue of its participation in the fraudulent statement, could be held
liable against a private plaintiff under § 10(b).1 11 Indeed, the Court
rejected a rule that "would permit private plaintiffs to sue a person
who provides the false or misleading information that another person
then puts into the statement."112 Reminiscent of the deference exhib-
ited in Central Bank and Stoneridge, Justice Thomas noted that de-
spite the "significant influence" that JCM maintained over the funds,
a standard that would take such factors into consideration would be
"the responsibility of Congress and not the courts." 113
104. Id.
105. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
106. Id. at 2299.
107. Id. at 2304.
108. Id. at 2305.
109. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
110. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
111. See, e.g., Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000); Dannen-
berg v. Painewebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628-29 (9th
Cir. 1994). "Such suits-against entities that contribute 'substantial assistance' to the making of
a statement but do not actually make it-may be brought by the SEC but not by private parties."
Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2301 (citation omitted).
112. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 2304.
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2. The Janus Dissent
Authoring a vocal dissent, Justice Breyer took issue with both the
Court's strained reading of the word "make" and its failure to take
JCM's unique role as an investment adviser into account.114 Regard-
ing Justice Thomas's semantics, Justice Breyer urged that "[t]he En-
glish language does not impose upon the word 'make' boundaries of
the kind the majority finds determinative."s1 5 The dissent eschewed
the rhadamanthine approach, noting that "control, participation, and
relevant audience, help determine who 'makes' a statement and to
whom that statement may properly be 'attributed.'" 16 To wit,
"[e]very day, hosts of corporate officials make statements with con-
tent that more senior officials or the board of directors have 'ultimate
authority' to control.""17 With this in mind, the dissent cited multiple
cases that make it clear that traditionally auxiliary actors, such as cor-
porate officers, lawyers, accountants, and the like have been held lia-
ble under § 10(b)."18 The dissent emphasized that these secondary or
ancillary actors did not maintain ultimate authority over their
statements."19
Indeed, the dissent was alert to a possible inconsistent result with
the majority's rule. If, as here, the Funds' board asserts "ultimate au-
thority" over the statement, then "[w]hat is to happen when guilty
management writes a prospectus (for the board) containing materially
false statements and fools both the board and public into believing
they are true?"120 Justice Breyer noted that in such a scenario, techni-
cally no one could be found to have made the statement.121
The dissent likewise disagreed with the majority's decision to ignore
JCM's control and participation in determining whether they could be
held liable under § 10(b).1 2 2 Regarding the day-to-day management,
business advice, as well as "administrative, compliance and accounting
services for the funds," the dissent noted the propinquity within which
the Fund and JCM operated.123 Observing that JCM drafted, re-
114. Id. at 2306 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 2307.
116. Id.
117. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2307 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
118. See, e.g., SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008); McConville v. SEC, 465
F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2006); Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir.
1996).
119. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2311.
120. Id. at 2310.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 2312.
123. Id.
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viewed, and disseminated the Fund prospectuses, including the lan-
guage regarding the market timing, the dissent concluded that "Janus
Management's involvement in preparing and writing the relevant
statements could hardly have been greater."124 Alluding to the major-
ity's holding, the dissent concluded by observing that the current rule
would allow a company's board of directors to evade liability simply
by enlisting an unwitting company manager to perpetrate the fraud.125
IV. CRITIQUES AND DEVELOPMENTS FOLLOWING JANUS
A. Criticism
The Janus decision is not without its detractors.126 The decision es-
sentially held that a mutual fund advisory firm could not have made
the fraudulent statement, "even though it allegedly created the lie in
question-because the prospectus in which the lie appeared was filed
by and in the name of the mutual fund, not the adviser or its publicly-
held parent company." 27 The Court's strained reading of the term
has been derided for its failure to incorporate SEC comments or to
acknowledge the original rule's intent, all in the name of judicial def-
erence.128 In fact, one scholar questioned whether Justice Thomas
"refuse[d] to defer to the SEC's reading of the word make because no
deference is owed regarding the private right of action," questioning if
the Court was construing whether the narrow dimensions apply to the
rule or to the right.129 In any event, the Court refused to yield any
deference to the SEC over the interpretation of the word make, de-
spite that the SEC promulgated the rule in the first place.130
The Court appears to have shunned any meaningful attribution
analysis in favor of a formalistic semantic exercise.' 3' This is espe-
124. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Ann Carrns, Supreme Court Ruling in Janus Case Limits Shareholder Suits,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2011, 3:18 PM), http://bucks.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/13/supreme-court-
ruling-in-janus-case-limits-shareholder-suits/#; Brent Kendall, Janus Found Not Liable for
Funds' Prospectuses, WALL ST. J. (June 14, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052
702303848104576383453742250090.html; Floyd Norris, A Novel Way to Sidestep Investor Suits,
N.Y. TIMEs (Dec. 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/business/03norris.html?_r=1.
127. See Langevoort, supra note 33, at 1.
128. Id. at 6 ("Note what the Court does not do-ask what a reasonable person would think
the SEC meant to accomplish with its chosen language. Any sense of original intent is ignored,
and the interpretation comes to turn heavily on policy (confining private litigation) that could
not have existed at the time the SEC's words were written .... ).
129. Id. at 5 (quoting Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2303 n.8) (internal quotation marks omitted).
130. See generally Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296. The SEC adopted Rule lOb-5 in 1942. Cent. Bank
of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 172 (1994).
131. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2302.
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cially puzzling in light of the evidence demonstrating that the inves-
tors would have directly attributed the statements to the investment
adviser.132 Specifically, provided that "Janus Management's involve-
ment in preparing and writing the relevant statements could hardly
have been greater," 133 as well as that "Janus Management employees
drafted and reviewed the Fund prospectuses, including language
about 'market timing,"' 134 and that "under the heading, 'Management
of the Fund,' the February 25, 2002, prospectus for the Janus Mercury
Fund list[ed] only . . . JCM,"s3 5 the Court nevertheless refused to util-
ize a meaningful attribution analysis.136 Had the Court done so, it
might have reasoned, provided all of the information in support, that
the investors did attribute the statements to JCM, and thus, the truly
culpable party would have been held liable.137
In a New York Times article, Professor Mercer Bullard observed
that "[t]he decision may mean that fund shareholders who suffer
losses as a result of a misleading prospectus will not be able to reach
the responsible person-[JCM]."138 Professor Bullard was particu-
larly skeptical of the Court's decision in light of a previous decision
finding that mutual fund managers "exercised de facto control over its
funds."139 Indeed, in a Wall Street Journal article, Professor William
Birdthistle commented, "[e]veryone knows the fund is an empty mari-
onette. It doesn't do anything. . . . [Investors are] left with a circum-
stance where no one is responsible." 140 An argument in favor of
holding the Fund's investment adviser liable is particularly appropri-
ate in light of the fact that mutual fund investors "stand[ ] in a disad-
vantaged position in terms of identifying information probative of
problems affecting his or her investments."14 1 Thus, Janus seems only
to frustrate mutual fund investors' means of recourse even further.
Methodology aside, the decision's potential impact has generated
even more scrutiny, specifically for its deference to the corporate
132. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text. See generally In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig.,
566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009).
133. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d at 126.
136. See generally Janus, 131 S. Ct. 2296.
137. Id. at 2311-12 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. Carrns, supra note 126 (internal quotation marks omitted).
139. Id.
140. Kendall, supra note 126.
141. In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 407, 423 (D.N.J.
2007).
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form.14 2 According to Professor Birdthistle, so long as investment
managers "perpetuate their malfeasance through a business trust," the
managers will be legally insulated.143 Again, Justice Breyer echoed
these very same dangers.144 In any event, it is highly likely that secon-
dary actors will continue to exact corporate malfeasance behind the
scenes, only now quite possibly outside of Janus's circumscribed
§ 10(b) parameters, leaving the onus on private plaintiffs to elude its
rigid barriers and strictures.
B. Application
1. Corporate Officers
Criticism notwithstanding, courts have applied Janus relatively con-
sistently in determining whether traditional secondary actors-non-
executive corporate officers and related corporate entities-are liable
in light of Janus. In Hawaii Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole,
former shareholders of a corporation brought suit against three for-
mer officers of the corporation on the grounds that the officers col-
luded in falsifying financial information.145 The defendants, according
to the complaint, acted in response to a directive by the CEO and
CFO in conducting the alleged malfeasance.146 The defendants
moved to dismiss on the ground that, "because they never made any
statements to the investing public, no one could have relied on any
statements by them."1 47 The defendants argued that, at most, they
were liable as aiders and abettors, which, as proven in Central Bank,
would shield them from private liability under § 10(b).148 The court
denied the motion to dismiss, but in light of Janus, the defendants
moved to reconsider. 149 The plaintiff asserted that Janus did not ap-
ply, because "[i]n essence, Janus involve[d] a secondary actor and thus
Janus does not analyze whether corporate executives can be liable." 50
Undeterred, the court held that the plaintiffs mischaracterized the
standard and granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in finding that
142. See Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2312 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (discussing the possibility of guilty
management but an innocent board in eluding private liability).
143. Norris, supra note 126.
144. Janus, 131 S. Ct. at 2305-12.
145. See Haw. Ironworkers Annuity Trust Fund v. Cole, No. 3:10CV371, 2011 WL 3862206, at
*1 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011).
146. Id. at *4.
147. Id. at *1.
148. Id.
149. Id. at *3.
150. Cole, 2011 WL 3862206, at *3 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the officers, in acting as puppets for the CEO and CFO, necessarily
did not "have ultimate authority over the content of the statement."151
Likewise, in In re Coinstar Inc., a district court was faced with a
complaint brought, inter alia, against three corporate officers under
§ 10(b).15 2 In a case surrounding misleading statements pertaining to
the corporation's earnings, the defendants argued that the three cor-
porate officers should be dismissed from the action because they did
not make any of the allegedly misleading statements. 153 In granting
the motion to dismiss against the three officers, the court found that
"engag[ing] in the preparation, creation, development, and dissemina-
tion of . . . false financial guidance" was not enough to generate pri-
mary liability in light of Janus's ultimate authority test.154
In circumscribing reliable and useful guidelines for determining
who has ultimate authority over a statement, the court in Kerr v. Ex-
obox Technologies Corp. weighed the role that control over a com-
pany played in private § 10(b) litigation. 55 In that case, the plaintiffs
asserted that the defendant owned near or in excess of 90% of Ex-
obox and thus was in control of the corporation.156 However, the
court rejected the argument, holding that "just because a person or
entity may 'control' the company filing the document does not mean
that the control person can be liable under 10b-5 for making the state-
ments."157 Essentially, controlling the company does not equate to
controlling the statements; the court held that despite the demonstra-
tive executive power, the plaintiff failed to show that the defendant
had "ultimate control over the statements."15 8
However, where a corporate officer makes statements pursuant to
his responsibility and authority to act on behalf of the corporation,
signs SEC forms, and reports as an executive vice president, he may
151. Id. at *5.
152. See In re Coinstar Inc. Sec. Litig., No. C11-133 MJP, 2011 WL 4712206, at *1 (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 6, 2011).
153. Id. at *10.
154. Id. at *10-11 (internal quotation marks omitted).
155. Kerr v. Exobox Techs. Corp., No. H-10-4221, 2012 WL 201872, at *11-12 (S.D. Tex. Jan.
23, 2012).
156. Id. at *6-7.
157. Id. at *11 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs' argument conflated the Janus controlling-
the-statement standard with control person liability under § 20(a) of the Exchange Act. How-
ever, the Janus Court rejected the argument that plaintiffs asserted here, distinguishing liability
under § 10b-5 from liability under § 20(a). Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders,
131 S. Ct. 2296, 2304 (2011) (declining to "read into Rule 10b-5 a theory of liability similar to-
but broader in application than-what Congress has already created expressly elsewhere" (cita-
tion omitted)).
158. Kerr, 2012 WL 201872, at *11 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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be said to have made the statement under Janus.5 9 In that case, the
court was persuaded by the fact that the corporate officer made state-
ments in his capacity as an agent of the corporation, not of some other
independent legal entity such as JCM.16 0 Similarly, where CEO's and
CFO's fraudulently sign Sarbanes-Oxley certifications, courts will find
that the officers have ultimate authority over the statements.161 In
light of Janus's holding that "attribution within a statement . . . is
strong evidence that a statement was made by ... the party to whom it
is attributed," one court held that where a corporate officer's name
was emboldened and prominently placed on the first page of the "Of-
ficial Statements," the statement is sufficiently attributable to plead
that the named person made the statement.162
In SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, the court refused to allow a
claim against a corporate officer where she was alleged to have merely
been involved in preparing allegedly fraudulent annual and quarterly
financial reports.163 However, where the same officer was alleged to
have both prepared and signed false and misleading proxy statements,
the court was willing to consider her the maker of such statements.164
Interestingly, one court held that Janus applies to a defendant's
omissions, despite that the defendant technically did not make the
statement at issue.165 In Lopes v. Viera, the plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant induced them to invest into a corporation on the premise
that the corporation "would manufacture cheese for which there was a
ready market."166 At issue was the defendant's failure to disclose his
former role as a corporate officer of a criminally and civilly investi-
gated company.167 The plaintiffs alleged that they were rushed into
committing to invest in the corporation based upon a draft offering
memorandum that did not contain language regarding the defendant's
history.168 The defendant argued that he cannot be held liable under
159. Compare In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., MDL No. 1658 (SRC),
2011 WL 3444199, at *25 (D.N.J. Aug. 8, 2011), with Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643
F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding SEC filing authority not sufficient to show ultimate authority).
160. In re Merck & Co. Sec., Derivative & "ERISA" Litig., 2011 WL 3444199, at *25.
161. Local 738 I.B. of T., No. 87 C 8478, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5725, at *3 (N.D. Ill. June 7,
1988).
162. In re Allstate Life Ins. Co. Litig., No. CV-09-8162-PCT-GMS, 2012 WL 176497, at *5 (D.
Ariz. Jan. 23, 2012). On the other hand, see SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL
3295139 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2011), where a picture of a corporate officer on the alleged statement
was insufficient to prove he was the "maker" of the statements.
163. See No. 5:07-CV-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 5871020, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011).
164. Id. at *2.
165. Lopes v. Viera, No. 1:06-CV-01243 JLT, 2012 WL 691665, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 2, 2012).
166. Id.
167. Id. at *5.
168. Id.
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Janus, since he was not technically the maker of the statement.169 The
court responded with two arguments.170 First, because the defendant
was the maker of the offering statement and the rest of the statement
can be attributed to him, the material omission and its attendant lia-
bility can be attributed to him as well.171 Second, the court turned to
scheme liability to answer the claim that Janus did not address misrep-
resentations by omission.172 Under Rule lOb-5(a), a defendant who
uses a "device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" may be held liable in a
suit by a private plaintiff. 73 In addition to the omission or misrepre-
sentation, the court found that the defendant had committed various
financial improprieties sufficient to establish a "device, scheme, or ar-
tifice to defraud."174
2. Entities
As in Janus, multiple courts have demarcated the boundaries within
which affiliated or auxiliary entities may be held liable for statements
made under § 10(b).175 In a class action before the Southern District
of New York, the plaintiffs sued to recover funds lost in an investment
with Optimal Strategic U.S. Equity Fund, which in turn invested all of
its assets with Bernie Madoff.176 The plaintiffs alleged that defendant
OIS maintained ultimate authority over the allegedly misleading
statements articulated in "Explanatory Memoranda," which was is-
sued by Optimal Multiadvisors, the primary actor.'77 The plaintiffs
169. Id. Technically, the defendant cannot have ultimate authority over the statement, nor
can the absence of a statement be attributed to him.
170. See Lopes, 2012 WL 691665, at *6.
171. Id.
172. Id. Briefly, scheme liability, first addressed by the Court in Central Bank, is a theory by
which all actors in a fraudulent scheme may be held liable for the conduct of the greater. In
Central Bank, the Court weighed whether to hold liable "any person or entity ... who employs a
manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or
seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under lOb-5." Cent. Bank of Den-
ver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). On the basis of this
statement, "plaintiffs have been creative in finding ways to characterize the behavior of secon-
dary actors as not amounting to merely aiding and abetting, but as active involvement as a pri-
mary participant in the securities fraud." Taavi Annus, Scheme Liability Under Section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 Mo. L. REv. 855, 858 (2007). The scheme liability door
appeared to close, however, in Stoneridge, where the Court held that the secondary actors them-
selves needed to satisfy all of the 10(b) elements for liability. Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 158 (2008).
173. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(a) (2012).
174. Lopes, 2012 WL 691665, at *6.
175. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text; see infra notes 176-86 and accompanying
text.
176. See In re Optimal U.S. Litig., No. 10 Civ. 4095(SAS), 2011 WL 4908745, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 14, 2011).
177. Id.
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argued that OIS owned 100% of the voting shares of Multiadvisors,
retained appointment and removal power over Multiadvisors, and that
OIS's CEO was a director of Multiadvisors.178 Nevertheless, the court
refocused the inquiry to whether OIS maintained ultimate authority
over the "Explanatory Memoranda"-the statements-rather than
authority over the corporation itself.179 As such, the court found that
despite the control over the entity, OIS did not maintain control over
the statements and summarily granted the defendant's motion to
dismiss. 80
In a case before the Ninth Circuit, BP Exploration Alaska (BPXA)
was held not to have ultimate authority over allegedly fraudulent SEC
filings on behalf of a trust, despite that it was authorized to make the
filings for the trust.18 The case was a class action arising out of the
August 2006 shutdown of the oil facilities in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. 18 2
Harkening back to what is now the superannuated substantial partici-
pation test, the plaintiffs failed to allege that BPXA actually partici-
pated in and had authority over the trust's filing process, violating the
substantial participation attribution test.'83 Of course, the court also
found the plaintiffs to have insufficiently satisfied Janus.184 The court
held that while BPXA "bore a statutory obligation to file with the
SEC," without an allegation that BPXA made the statements within
the filings or had ultimate authority over the statements, it could not
find for the plaintiff.'85
Contrastingly, in one case, the Southern District of New York found
that a legally distinct entity could be held liable under Janus.86
There, the plaintiffs brought a § 10b-5 action claiming that one corpo-
ration, EnergySolutions (ES), issued an IPO with materially false
statements. 87 The plaintiffs also named ES's sole shareholder, ENV
Holdings, Inc. (ENV), who moved to dismiss, noting that, as in Janus,
178. Id. at *4.
179. Id. at *5.
180. Id.
181. See Reese v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 643 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2011).
182. Id. at 684.
183. Id. at 693 n.8; see Howard v. Everex Sys., Inc., 228 F.3d 1057, 1061 n.5 (9th Cir. 2000)
("[S]ubstantial participation or intricate involvement in the preparation of fraudulent statements
is grounds for primary liability even though that participation might not lead to the actor's actual
making of the statements."); see also Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144 (2d
Cir. 2010).
184. Reese, 643 F.3d at 693 n.8.
185. Id.
186. See City of Roseville Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 814 F. Supp. 2d 395
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
187. Id. at 400-01.
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"ENV and ES are legally distinct entities despite having the same in-
dividuals in key positions."188 However, key differences, such as the
disclosure in the registration statement that ES was wholly owned by
ENV and that ENV would "have the ability to effectively control all
[of ES's] matters requiring stockholder approval, including . . . the
determination of the outcome of any corporate transaction," were ad-
judged to be material differences.'89 In finding that ENV made the
statements in the IPO, the court differentiated the case from Janus by
highlighting that "the Registration Statements made clear that [ENV]
controlled the actions of ES-including its sale of stock," and thus
ENV maintained "ultimate authority" over "the content of the mes-
sage, the underlying subject matter of the message, and the ultimate
decision of whether to communicate the message." 190
3. SEC Enforcement Claims
The Court's broad interpretation of antifraud liability, however, has
not since been extended to SEC enforcement actions, insofar as
§ 10(b) is not the defining instrument. 191 United States SEC v. Stoker
is instructive. 192 There, the SEC brought an action under § 17(a), 193
the Securities Act of 1933's comparable antifraud provision, against a
broker-dealer's director in connection with his role in structuring and
marketing a synthetic collateralized debt obligation (CDO). 19 4 De-
spite the nearly parallel wording between § 17(a) and § 10(b), in this
case, Judge Jed Rakoff observed that "there are significant difference
[sic] between the language of 17(a) and the language of 10b-5 that
dictate different results." 195 Whereas in Janus one is liable for making
the untrue statement, § 17(a)(2), unlike Rule 10b-5, prohibits a defen-
dant from obtaining money "by means of" an untrue statement. 196
Here, the court found that the defendant could be held liable "under
17(a)(2), though not under 10b-5, if, he obtains money or property by
use of a false statement, whether prepared by himself or by an-
188. Id. at 417.
189. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
190. Id. at 418.
191. See, e.g., U.S. SEC v. Sentinel Mgmt. Grp., Inc., No. 07 C 4684, 2012 WL 1079961, at *15
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2012); SEC v. Pentagon Capital Mgmt. PLC, 844 F. Supp. 2d 377, 421-23
(S.D.N.Y. 2012); SEC v. Mercury Interactive, LLC, No. 5:07-cv-02822-WHA, 2011 WL 5871020,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2011); SEC v. Daifotis, No. C 11-00137 WHA, 2011 WL 3295139 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 1, 2011).
192. 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
193. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2006).
194. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 458.
195. Id. at 464-65.
196. Id. at 465.
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other."197 Obviating the need to address the relevant policy concerns
articulated in Stoneridge,198 the court found that with no private right
of action implied under § 17(a), the court was free to disregard the
Court's narrow interpretation in Janus and read § 17(a) more
broadly.199
V. CONCLUSION
In an admittedly small sample size, it seems that the Janus test eval-
uating who qualifies to make a statement is being consistently fol-
lowed, though corporate officers and separate entities can still be held
liable. The test, in line with Central Bank and Stoneridge, is notewor-
thy for its deference to corporate forms and the Court's general un-
willingness to broach what it deems the province of the legislature. As
the landscape continues to grow, cases distinguishing between control
over a statement and control over a company, cases involving an omis-
sion of a statement rather than a made statement, and cases involving
a sham corporation through which the board makes statements should
gain significant attention in demarcating the outer boundaries of pri-
vate § 10(b) liability in light of Janus.
197. Id.
198. See In re Mut. Funds Inv. Litig., 566 F.3d 111 (4th Cir. 2009).
199. Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 465 ("By contrast, Section 17(a) ... prohibits a defendant from
obtaining money 'by means of' an untrue statement. Although 'to make a statement' is the
equivalent of 'to state,' to obtain money 'by means of' a statement plainly covers a broader range
of activity. Thus, the emphasis of the Janus Court on the word 'make' serves, if anything, to
highlight the importance of the difference in language between the two provisions.").
